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Abstract 
Most current methods for studying cascading effects rely on written sources to extract 
information. This thesis presents an empirical method for studying cascading effects, when 
little written information of the event is available. The method presented has been 
influenced by incident investigation methods. It has been applied on a case of flooding in 
south of Sweden and revised based on the results. The case study showed that the method 
is able to gather and structure information about cascading effects and conditions that 
affect the outcome of cascading effects. An advantage of this method is that it captures 
conditions as well as potential cascading effects. 
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Summary 
Most current methods for studying cascading effects rely on written sources to extract 
information, such as post-disaster assessments, scientific articles or media articles. This 
thesis presents an empirical method for studying cascading effects, when little written 
information of the event is available. The intended users of this method are researchers of 
cascading effects or, to a lesser degree, incident investigation teams or managers.  
 A literature review of incident investigation methods has influenced the method, thus 
partly building on previous research. Its main components consist of semi-structured 
interviews and modified STEP-diagrams, with some inclusion of counterfactual 
reasoning. It aims to gather information about the affected system, the consequences of 
that system, the type of dependency, the originating system, time and geographical 
extent, cascade order and conditions. Conditions are circumstances that aggravated or 
mitigated the effects of a cascading effect.  
 A case study of the floods in Malmö, August 31st 2014, showed that the method is able 
to gather and structure information about cascading effects and conditions that affect the 
outcome of cascading effects. The study consisted of six interviews with key persons 
within organisations, which are involved in management of critical infrastructure 
according to the system definitions used in this thesis. The review of the study showed 
some flaws in the original design; it was not feasible to gather all the desired information 
in one interview. Therefore the suggested method was modified slightly, so that the time 
and geographical extent inquiries will conducted at a later time in the process, and not 
during the initial interviews.  
 An advantage of this method is that it captures conditions, giving extra detail, as well 
as potential cascading effects, which can provide valuable information about suitable 
cascade breaking measures. 
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Sammanfattning 
De flesta nuvarande metoderna för att studera kaskadeffekter använder sig av skriftliga 
källor för att samla information, såsom olycksutredningar, vetenskapliga artiklar eller 
nyheter. Det här examensarbetet presenterar en empirisk metod för att studera 
kaskadeffekter när det finns få skriftliga källor tillgängliga. Målgruppen är forskare som 
studerar kaskadeffekter och, till mindre grad, olycksutredningsteam eller ledare. 
 En litteraturstudie av olycksutredningsmetoder har influerat metoden som presenteras, 
därmed bygger den delvis på tidigare genomförd forskning. Dess huvudkomponenter 
består av semi-strukturerade intervjuer och modifierade STEP-diagram, med viss 
inblandning av kontrafaktiska resonemang. Målet är att samla information om det 
påverkade systemet, konsekvenserna i det systemet, typ av beroende, ursprungssystemet, 
utbredning i tid och rum, kaskadordning och conditions. Conditions är tillfälligheter som 
påverkade kaskadeffekten negativt eller positivt. 
 En fallstudie av översvämningarna i Malmö, den 31:e augusti 2014, visade att 
metoden klarade av att samla och strukturera information om kaskadeffekter och 
conditions som påverkade resultatet av kaskadeffekterna. Studien bestod av sex intervjuer 
med nyckelpersoner inom organisationer som bedriver samhällsviktig verksamhet, såsom 
det är definierat i det här arbetet. Studien visade på vissa brister i originalförslaget, det 
var inte möjligt att samla all önskad information vid ett tillfälle. Därför modifierades 
metoden lite, så att frågorna om utbredning i tid och rum genomförs i ett senare stadie, 
och inte under den första intervjun. 
 En fördel med denna metod är att den fångar in conditions, vilket ger extra 
detaljeringsgrad, så väl som potentiella kaskadeffekter, vilka kan förse värdefull 
information om lämpliga åtgärder för att bryta kaskadeffekter.  
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1 Introduction 
Critical infrastructure protection is a research area that has been expanding; in Sweden 
the Civil Contingency Agency has put a lot of effort into developing a national strategy 
for protecting critical societal functions (here regarded the same as critical infrastructure) 
and mapping dependencies between them the last few years (Fylkner, 2009; Gellerbring, 
Holmgren, & Rinne, 2014). Also, in 2006 the European Union started a European 
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection to create a common, European, 
framework for protecting infrastructure (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES, 2006). Further, in the U.S. there was an increased awareness of 
infrastructure vulnerability within the homeland security agencies after the attack on the 
World Trade Centre. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 stressed the importance of 
protecting critical infrastructures and redefined which ones that was to be considered 
critical (Moteff & Parfomak, 2004). 
 A part of protecting critical infrastructure involves preventing cascading effects 
between them. A cascading effect occurs when one critical infrastructure affects another, 
usually negatively, through dependencies between them, for example when a water 
supply system starts experiencing problems after a failure in the power supply system, 
because the pumps are dependent on electricity. Some of the important research 
conducted on cascading effects so far includes the work of Rinaldi et al. (2001) who 
developed a comprehensive theoretical framework and terminology for cascading effects 
between critical infrastructures (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001). Many researchers 
have adopted the terminology or adapted it to their own liking, including two of the 
research groups below.  
 A Canadian research group have studied large-scale power outages in North America 
in great detail, using media reports and official ex post assessments (McDaniels, Chang, 
Peterson, Mikawoz, & Reed, 2007). However, they only study events where the electrical 
infrastructure is the starting point of the cascading effects (they call it infrastructure 
failure interdependencies), which limits the number of events that can be studied and also 
in large extent disregards systems that are not dependent of power. 
Introduction 
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 Another approach is to search a large amount of media articles for any kind of 
disruption in a critical infrastructure, then analyse each result and compile into a 
database, which is what a Dutch research group has done (Luiijf, Nieuwenhuijs, Klaver, 
van Eeten, & Cruz, 2009). Their research suggests that cascading effects are quite 
common, but are mainly involved two sectors, the energy and the telecom sectors. This 
could be an effect of the search words used: disruption(s), outage(s), blackout and power 
cut, which are words commonly associated with these sectors. When reporting about the 
health sector, however, a reporter is more likely to use words like: overcrowding, 
cancelled surgeries, staff shortage, medicine shortage or similar. 
 What if someone wants to study the cascading effects that occurred during an event, 
which is badly documented or has yet to be documented? In this case the methods used 
by McDaniels et al. (2007) and Luiijf et al. (2009) are not applicable. Therefore, another 
method is needed to provide a deeper understanding of the event and the possible 
cascading effects related to that event. 
 The purpose of this thesis is to develop a method for studying cascading effects, 
including conditions, which can be used even if there is a scarcity of written documents. 
The method should be able to gather and structure information about cascading effects 
and its most important characteristics. 
 In the long run, the results from a number of case studies can be used to: identify 
vulnerable systems, support risk and vulnerability analysis efforts, develop an incident 
support tool or model cascading effects. 
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2 Objective & Aim 
The scope of the thesis is to propose and evaluate a method for studying which cascading 
effects has emerged between different critical infrastructures during an event and how 
conditions can affect the outcome. More specifically, the objectives are to: 
• Conduct a survey of the methods used in similar research areas. 
• Develop a method for in-depth study of events, with the purpose of acquiring 
knowledge about cascading effects and the conditions associated with cascading 
effects. The method should focus on gathering and structuring information. 
• Perform a case study, in order to apply, evaluate and revise the proposed method.  
2.1 Research questions 
• What characteristics should the proposed method have in order to be useful for 
studying cascading effects? 
• What methods can be found in related research areas that can provide a basis for 
the method developed in this thesis? 
• How should the method look like in order to take the relevant characteristics into 
consideration? 
• Is the method capable of satisfying the relevant characteristics, and if not, what 
revisions are necessary? 
Method 
 4 
3 Method 
In this chapter, the general work process of the thesis will be presented. An overview of 
this process can be found in Figure 1. In the beginning of each chapter there will be a 
miniature of Figure 1 as a reminder. The steps included in the chapter will be marked 
with red. To develop a method for studying cascading effects, a general model of the 
phenomena needs to be developed or adopted. Then desired characteristics of the 
cascading effects will determine the design of the method. 
 In order to draw knowledge from previous research, incident investigation methods 
will be studied through a literature review, since it is an area closely related to what this 
thesis is set out to accomplish. The investigation methods are then evaluated with the 
ability to gather information of the desired characteristics in mind. Other information 
gathering methods will also be studied depending on the amount of incident investigation 
methods found.  
 The proposed method will be based on the results of the literature review and modified 
to fit the study of cascading effects as the phenomenon has been defined.  
 To test the proposed method and determine its usefulness and its ability to gather the 
desired information, it will be used on a small case study. This is followed by an 
evaluation, where the study, experiences from it and its results are discussed. Lastly the 
method will be revised according to the evaluation of the case study. 
A method for studying cascading effects 
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Figure 1. Work process overview. A miniature figure will be shown in the beginning of each chapter, where red 
marks the parts that are included in the chapter.  
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4 Cascading effects 
There are many different opinions regarding the 
definition of a cascading effect, many researchers use 
their own, slightly different, terminology, as has been 
mentioned shortly in the introductory chapter. This 
chapter aims to provide some clarification of how the 
term cascading effects and related terminology will be 
used in this thesis.  
 The first section will describe the definition of cascading effects used in this thesis and 
introduce some of the core terminology. The second section will cover the different 
system boundaries used and compare them to other projects’ definitions. The third, and 
last, section will introduce the desired characteristics of cascading effects and why they 
are important.  
4.1 Definition of cascading effects 
In this thesis, a cascading effect is defined in accordance with the definition used in the 
CascEff1 project. It is as follows: 
Cascading effects are the impacts of an initiating event where 
1. System dependencies lead to impacts propagating to other systems, and; 
2. The combined impacts of the propagated event are of greater consequences than 
the root impacts, and; 
3. Multiple stakeholders and/or responders are involved. 
                                                
1 The aim of the project is to improve our understanding of the cascading effects in crisis 
situations to reduce the consequences of escalating incidents in complex environments. 
The EU project CascEff is funded via the Seventh Framework Programme. The CascEff 
consortium consists of eleven partners from five countries and is coordinated by SP 
Technical Research Institute of Sweden (CascEff, 2015). Lund University is a partner in 
the project.  
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Bullet one describes the basic requirement, but leaves the concept of system up for 
interpretation. It also presents the mechanism behind cascading effects, the dependency, 
which is the link that connects systems to each other. If two systems are affected at the 
same time, but there is no tangible link between them, there is no cascading effect (e.g. a 
polluted ecosystem and a non-functional financial transaction system). 
 The second bullet effectively excludes events where a system has a positive effect on 
another. 
 Bullet three, although loosely formulated and up for interpretation, encourages a 
societal perspective and can be used to discard cascading effects with minor societal 
impact (e.g. a single wrecked car caused by a cascading effect). This means that 
cascading effects as understood in this thesis often arises between critical infrastructures. 
Bullet three also provides some support in determining system boundaries, by implying a 
multi-organisational perspective. It also, together with bullet one, excludes cascading 
effects within the same system, since only one stakeholder would typically be involved 
(e.g. a short circuit damaging a logic component in a mobile phone tower, rendering it 
non-operational).  
 
Figure 2. Illustration of terminology. 
4.2 System definitions 
The definition of cascading effects used in this paper mentions systems, but leaves the 
meaning of a system up for interpretation. In fact, systems are an essential part of the 
definition. Determining what a system is, and its boundaries, is important but can always 
Cascading effects 
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be criticised in one way or another since it is always possible to draw the boundaries 
differently. This is especially the case when dealing with larger, more complex systems. 
Cilliers (2001), for example, argues that the boundaries of a complex system can never be 
clearly defined, because: 
“Boundaries are simultaneously a function of the activity of the system itself, and a 
product of the strategy of description involved. In other words, we frame the system 
by describing it in a certain way (for a certain reason), but we are constrained in 
where the frame can be drawn. The boundary of the system is therefore neither 
purely a function of our description, nor is it a purely natural thing.” (Cilliers, 
2001, p.141) 
Critical infrastructures can definitely be described, and often are, as complex systems 
(McDaniels et al., 2007; Peters, Buzna, & Helbing, 2008; Rinaldi et al., 2001). This leads 
to the problem mentioned above. In this thesis critical infrastructures will be treated as 
complex systems, and “system” will be the term dominantly used.  
 The difficulty of determining system boundaries can be demonstrated by comparing 
some classifications of critical infrastructures that has been used in Europe and U.S. 
lately.  
 In the United States, the critical infrastructures mentioned in official reports and 
directives have varied over time (1983-2003); ranging from 3 to 26 different systems 
(Moteff & Parfomak, 2004). Energy, Transportation, Telecommunications, Water 
Supply, Banking and Finance, Emergency Services and Government Continuity are the 
ones mentioned most frequently in the U.S. reports. The sectors used by the two most 
recent reports in the article are presented in Figure 3. 
 The Swedish Civil Contingency Agency (MSB) uses 11 sectors of important societal 
activities (i.e. critical infrastructures), with some further division into functions within 
each sector (Gellerbring et al., 2014).  
 A research group from the Netherlands divides critical infrastructure into 12 groups, 
similar to the MSB ones (Luiijf et al., 2009). 
 For the purpose of the CascEff project, 21 different systems are used. This 
classification provides a bit more detail within the two major sectors energy and 
transportation as well as some additional systems important for the project. The systems 
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have been chosen to capture cascading effect on a societal level. They have also been 
defined more according to the infrastructure they use, for example the different 
transportation systems all use different infrastructure, even if the purpose is generally the 
same: to carry goods and people. 
 The four different classifications are shown in Figure 3, where the different classes 
have been ordered by similarity. Noticeable is that only a few of the system classes are 
unique to their classification, which, albeit the sample is small, gives an indication of 
agreement among the research community.  
 Figure 3 also demonstrates that, even though the CascEff classification contains more 
systems, it is within reasonable agreement with the previous research in the area of 
critical infrastructure. 
Cascading effects 
 10 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of system boundaries between CascEff, U.S. reports and executive orders (Moteff & 
Parfomak, 2004), Swedish Civil Contingency Agency (MSB) (Gellerbring et al., 2014) and a Dutch research 
group (Luiijf et al., 2009). 
A method for studying cascading effects 
 11 
4.3 Desired characteristics of cascading effects 
One could include as many characteristics of cascading effects as one need, but it will 
also make the information gathering process more demanding. There are, however, some 
that has been deemed to be essential or more interesting for this thesis. These include the 
originating system, the dependent system, type of dependency, consequences on the 
dependent system, time start and end, spatial extent, cascade order and conditions. Why 
these are deemed important will be discussed in each of the following sections describing 
the aspects.  
 Since these characteristics are deemed extra important, it should be a requirement for 
the suggested method to be able to gather information about them. Therefore, they will 
also be used to evaluate existing investigation methods in Chapter 5.  
 Before presenting the suggested characteristics in more detail, it should be noted that 
the initiating event is not considered a characteristic of a cascading effect within this 
thesis. Instead it is used for informational purposes and to find the direct effects of the 
event. This is due to the definition of cascading effects used in this thesis, where the 
effect has to propagate from one system to another. While some could argue that an 
initiating event can be a system, e.g. weather system, it is harder to argue that a fire or a 
train derailment is a system of its own; therefore it is treated as a trigger instead.  
4.3.1 Originating system 
An originating system is defined as a system in which a failure propagates to another 
system. For example a storm (initiating event) that strikes a power system (originating 
system), which leads to propagation of effects to other systems.  
4.3.2 Dependent system 
A dependent system is defined as a system, which is affected by a failure in another 
system. For example a failure occurs in a power system (originating system), which 
affects a telecommunication system (dependent system). 
 The most basic information needed regarding cascading effects is to know which 
systems are affected, here represented as the originating system and the dependent 
Cascading effects 
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system. With this information, supported by enough data, it should be possible to 
determine which systems are more likely to affect other systems.  
4.3.3 Type of dependency 
Systems can be dependent in different ways: physical, cyber, geographical and logical 
(Rinaldi et al., 2001).  
 Physical dependencies exist when a system is dependent on another systems material 
output. A simple example is the road transportations’ dependency on the petroleum 
industry; petrol, diesel and oil are required for the engines in cars and trucks. 
 Cyber dependencies are similar to their physical counterpart and occur when a system 
is dependent on information from another system. For example, the safe operation of 
railway transport is dependent on accurate information about the trains’ positions and 
speed, railroad switches, etc., which is provided by a specialised information system. 
 Since both physical and cyber dependencies means that one system is dependent on 
the function of another, they can also be referred to as functional dependencies. 
 If two systems can be affected by the same local event, they are geographically 
dependent. A quite common example is to use the same tunnels or pipes for the power 
grid and telecom cables (because it is cost efficient), but a small fire in a tunnel would 
affect both systems. 
 The fourth kind of dependency, the logical, is in essence the cases that do not fit into 
the other types. It is often the result of human behaviour and decisions, an example is 
holidaymakers flocking to highways due to low petrol prices, causing traffic congestions, 
thus, again, linking the petroleum industry to road transport, but in a different way 
(Rinaldi et al., 2001). 
 In order to break the propagation of effects, one must know what kind of mechanism 
that is enabling the propagation, the type of dependency. Knowing the type of 
dependency can help the incident strategic command decide which strategy is most 
suitable. If the dependency is logical, for example people calling their relatives after a 
disaster and blocking emergency calls, information to the public, asking them to restrict 
phone calls to emergency only, might be the best approach. On the other hand, if it is a 
functional dependency affecting the same system, for example a power failure disabling 
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mobile phone towers, the strategy might be to make sure repair crews can get to the 
affected areas safely. 
4.3.4 Consequences – Dependent system 
The consequences of a failure in the dependent system, which can be further 
distinguished into internal, affecting system only, and external, affecting society. Using 
the same example as in dependent system: the consequences in the telecommunication 
system might be non-operational mobile phone towers (internal consequence) and a 
number of people or organisations without any phone service (external consequence). 
 Learning more about the consequences of cascading effects is of interest when it 
comes to prioritisation, for governance and first response alike. Greater consequences 
usually require more immediate attention, whereas lesser ones could be ignored, if 
needed. However there is a great deal of uncertainty involved, since there always are 
conditions affecting the consequences: a power outage during summer in Sweden might 
be quite unproblematic, but the same outage can be of serious concern during winter.  
4.3.5 Time start and end 
The starting time, when the dependent system is starting to get affected, and ending time, 
when the dependent system is restored to normal operations, of a cascading effect can be 
used to determine the duration of the effect as well as the speed of propagation.  
 The time start and time end characteristics are also useful for planning an effective 
response. The time-lagged effects are of particular interest, since they might be 
preventable or at least mitigable. It is for example reasonable to prioritise systems that 
propagate effects faster over systems that have a slower development. The time start and 
end will also give a more detailed picture of the event-chain and make it easier to map the 
effects in the right order. 
4.3.6 Spatial extent 
The spatial extent refers to the area that is affected by the cascading effect. Many 
countries divide their response efforts in local, regional, national and international levels, 
which is one way to map the spatial extent. Another could be to use geographical 
information systems or GPS coordinates. 
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 Spatial extent can also be used to inform response decisions, cascading effects with a 
large extent are usually more demanding to handle and is thus more desirable to prevent, 
if possible. 
4.3.7 Cascade order 
The order of the pair of systems in an event, the first pair being the first order and if the 
effect should propagate further, the next pair would be the second order etc. See Figure 2 
for an illustration.  
 The cascade order can for example, together with originating system, be used to 
identify which systems that are more likely to propagate effects (i.e. the originating 
system of the first order). Securing the functionality of these systems at an early stage 
will likely reduce the amount of cascading effects. 
4.3.8 Conditions 
There will always be circumstances that affect cascading effects, either mitigating or 
aggravating the probability of a cascade or the consequences of the same, for example if 
bad weather keeps people inside their houses during a toxic gas leak, thus mitigating the 
exposure. The term for these circumstances will in this thesis be called conditions. These 
conditions are interesting to study, since they can be used to prevent or mitigate 
cascading effects. Conditions that mitigate the effect are desirable to recreate during 
another event (if possible) and likewise the conditions that aggravate the effects are 
desirable to avoid (again if possible). 
 To characterise conditions is not an easy task, since they come in every shape there is 
and in many cases they can be beneficial to some systems and, at the same time, have a 
severe effect on others. Another aspect to consider is that many conditions are case or 
system specific, for example London’s Air Ambulance had a gathering a few hundred 
meters from the initial explosion during the London bombings in 2005, allowing them to 
assemble 27 highly specialised physicians and paramedics instead of the normal two-man 
team (Hallet, 2011). The problem with the system specific conditions is that they are not 
applicable when the particular system is not involved. 
 There are, however, some types of conditions that are more general in nature. For 
example, consider the time of the day or year, timing, and how it could affect a power 
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outage. In winter with cold weather, people who depend on electricity for heating are 
more vulnerable than in the summertime, while the same outage might cause problems 
with cooling in summers, making other groups vulnerable, especially sick people. It is 
reasonable that the timing will affect the results of almost any kind of cascading effect. 
 Other general condition types, that are easily identifiable, are weather conditions and 
the type of location where the event take place or where the cascading effects take place. 
There might be other general types as well; perhaps a case study will bring light to some 
of them. 
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5 Existing incident investigation methods 
In this chapter, a review of several different incident 
investigation methods developed and used by different 
organisations is presented. The review will be used to 
provide input for the development of the method for 
studying cascading effects. The methods are first 
described shortly, then an evaluation based on the 
perceived ability to gather information about the desired 
characteristics is summarised in a table, followed by a discussion. For more detailed 
descriptions, see the references related to each method. 
 The review was conducted with the help of other reviews: Sklet (2004) and Katsakiori 
et al. (2009). Most of the methods mentioned in these articles were researched 
individually as well, using the original creators works whenever possible. This was 
complemented by related articles found in scientific databases such as Scopus and 
Google Scholar as well as literature from Lund University libraries.  
5.1 Events and causal factor charting and analysis 
(ECFC/A) 
The ECFC/A method is developed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and is the 
basis of the investigations conducted by the department (DOE, 2012). The charting is 
conducted throughout the whole investigation process, continuously updating a timeline 
of events on the x-axis (from left to right), with their respective causal factors (i.e. 
conditions) on the y-axis. The analysis uses deductive reasoning in order to determine 
which events and causal factors that actually contributed to the accident, removing the 
ones that did not. The aim is to map all the contributing events up until the accident. 
 Barrier analysis, change analysis and root cause analysis are also vital parts of the 
DOE investigation process, used as support to the charting of events (DOE, 2012).  
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5.2 Barrier Analysis 
The foundation of the barrier analysis is Haddon’s energy model. The main principle is 
that an excess of energy from a hazard which a target then absorbs causes an accident 
(Haddon, 1980; Kjellén, 2000). Barriers are means to control, prevent or impede the 
energy from reaching the target (Sklet, 2004).  
 The basic steps according to the DOE manual are (DOE, 2012):  
• Identify the hazard and the target. 
• Identify each barrier. 
• Identify how the barrier performed. 
• Identify and consider probable causes of the barrier failure. 
• Evaluate the consequences of the failure in the accident.  
The barrier analysis is incorporated in many accident investigation methods, such as the 
MORT, TRIPOD, MTO-analysis and the AEB presented later. 
 A problem with barrier analysis in this context is the very narrow perspective; the 
hazards and respective barrier(s) are studied one at a time with no regard to timeline. 
However, one could view the originating system as a hazard, the dependent system as the 
target and then try to find barriers that will stop the propagating effects. To successfully 
apply this perspective, the kinds of energy that is usually considered most likely have to 
be adapted. This also questions the usefulness of the well-established prevention 
strategies that have been developed with this model, should it be used to study cascading 
effects (Haddon, 1980). 
5.3 Change Analysis 
The principle of change analysis is to compare the accident timeline with some kind of 
baseline when the system was operating under normal conditions, for example the week 
before or according to the design. The differences are analysed to determine what kind of 
impact they have on the outcome. This of course requires some kind of mapping of 
events before it can be conducted. In the DOE framework it is used to identify additional 
causal factors after a preliminary ECFC has been done (DOE, 2012).  
Existing incident investigation methods 
 18 
5.4 Root Cause Analysis (RCA) 
A root cause analysis aims to identify fundamental deficiencies in safety management 
systems that affects several causal factors and which would prevent similar accidents if 
corrected (DOE, 2012). There is no real agreement on what a root cause is amongst 
practitioners (Sutton, 2008) and performing an analysis forces the investigator to use their 
own judgements (DOE, 2012). Again, this requires some kind of charting and analysis of 
events before a root cause analysis can be performed. 
5.5 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
The event tree analysis is mainly used as a risk assessment method, where the focus is on 
event sequences after an initiating event (Kjellén, 2000). An event sequence is affected 
by whether safety functions and barriers are successful or not (Sklet, 2004). According to 
Sklet it can also be used as an investigation method, through the identification and 
illustration of the accident path. 
 The method has some similarities to CascEff’s way of charting cascading effects (i.e. 
start with an event and map a sequence of events (cascading effects) that follows it), but 
takes little consideration to conditions.  
5.6 Acci-map 
Like the ETA, the Acci-map is not a pure investigation method, but offers an interesting 
perspective (Sklet, 2004). It was developed by Rasmussen and the Swedish Rescue 
Services Agency and utilises an organisational perspective where the focus is on six 
levels of decision-making, from equipment and staff to regulatory and governmental level 
(Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). The accident is mapped from left to right according to 
the levels, where arrows are used to indicate influences. 
5.7 MTO-analysis 
The MTO-analysis, developed for the Swedish nuclear industry, is based on the idea that 
human, technical and organisational factors should be regarded as equal and interlocking 
parts of system safety (Rollenhagen, 2003). This is done by a structured analysis with 
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event-cause-diagrams, a change analysis and a barrier analysis, complemented by a 
checklist for common failure causes (Sklet, 2004). The diagram is drawn with the event 
chain in the middle, from left to right. The various conditions are plotted above, with a 
change analysis in the top. Below the event chain, the barrier analysis is presented. 
5.8 TRIPOD 
Accidents occur when active failures and latent conditions causes holes in the barriers 
protecting the systems, allowing the hazards to penetrate the defences and do damage 
(Reason, 1997). Furthermore, these active failures (i.e. errors or unsafe acts performed by 
workers) are a result of latent conditions (e.g. design flaws, working procedures and 
maintenance failures), which are the effect of decisions made by governments, designers, 
organisation management and more. An investigation should start with the accident and 
work backwards to identify these latent conditions (Sklet, 2004).  
5.9 Accident Evaluation and Barrier Function (AEB) 
AEB models an accident as a sequence of interactions between technical and human 
systems; to stop the accident from reoccurring the sequence must be broken through an 
adequate barrier (Katsakiori et al., 2009; Svensson, 2000). This method focuses only on 
one chain and does not account for time. AEB does not try to find underlying causes, 
because the aim is to analyse why barrier functions failed and how to strengthen them 
(Katsakiori et al., 2009). 
5.10 Sequential Timed Events Plotting (STEP) 
STEP is more of a way to visualise an accident than an analytical tool, the main feature is 
the use of a multi-linear event chain (Favarò, Jackson, Saleh, & Mavris, 2013; Sklet, 
2004). In Favarò et al. (2013) they use the technique to investigate air flight incidents.  
 Agents, persons or objects involved in the accident and that can change states or 
interact to create events, are plotted on the y-axis of the diagram (Nano & Derudi, 2013). 
Further, the x-axis represents time and arrows leading from and to events represent the 
sequential order as well as dependencies. Events are plotted on the row of the agent it 
belongs to and at the time it took place. 
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5.11 Systemic Cause Analysis Tree (SCAT) 
SCAT is based on the ILCI accident model, which consists of five blocks, each 
representing a part of an accident (Katsakiori et al., 2009; Sklet, 2004). The five blocks in 
the model are: Lack of control (management level), Basic causes (job and personal 
factors), Immediate causes (substandard acts and conditions), Incident (contact with 
harmful energy/substances) and Loss (Kjellén, 2000). An accident is investigated in the 
reverse order, with supporting checklists in order to encourage an investigation that 
stretches deeper than operator error (Sklet, 2004). 
5.12 Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) 
The MORT method makes use of the Haddon’s energy model, thus defines an accident as 
a lack of or inadequate barriers or control functions (Katsakiori et al., 2009; Kjellén, 
2000). MORT provides the analyst with a logical tree divided into three main branches, 
the S, R and M, each with a comprehensive set of questions (Katsakiori et al., 2009). The 
S-branch deals with oversight and omissions specific to the accident, the R-branch is 
known risk factors, but for some reason not controlled, and the M-branch investigates the 
management system (NRI, 2009). Before working with the questions in the tree, some 
kind of event sequencing (e.g. ECFA) and a barrier analysis should be performed (NRI, 
2009). 
 A problem with MORT is that it requires a lot of resources and expertise and is best 
suited for big, bureaucratic organisations, such as the U.S. nuclear industry, where it is 
used (Katsakiori et al., 2009). 
5.13 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
In a FTA, the analyst choses and defines an undesired event. All possible contributing 
events and factors are then diagrammed in a logical tree structure, using logical AND/OR 
gates to display relations between events (Katsakiori et al., 2009). The FTA gives little 
support to the investigating analyst, but a tool to visualise a logical representation of the 
accident (Katsakiori et al., 2009; Kjellén, 2000). 
A method for studying cascading effects 
 21 
5.14 Influence Diagram 
Paté-Cornell used an influence diagram as the basis of an investigation of the Piper Alpha 
accident, with a particular focus on three levels: basic events, decisions and actions and 
organisational (Pate-Cornell, 1993; Sklet, 2004). In order to draw a proper diagram, the 
basic events must be studied, and all actions and decisions related to that event are also 
mapped. Lastly, the actions and decisions are checked to see if they can be the cause of 
basic organisational factors (Sklet, 2004). The influence diagram should make a 
distinction between the different levels and show how each event, decision or 
organisational factors are related to each other, usually by boxes and arrows (Pate-
Cornell, 1993). 
5.15 Summary 
Typically, the investigation methods can be divided into three aspects: to gather 
information, to structure information and to analyse information. This said, not all 
methods cover all three aspects. 
 The way the investigation methods use to gather information about the event include 
interviews, workshops, physical evidence gathering, checklists, schematics, on site 
inspections and more. Some methods do not provide any support for gathering data, thus 
are purely analytical (e.g. RCA, AEB, FTA). Interviews are mentioned or implied in 
many methods, for example the use of checklist usually involves talking to people in 
order to answer the questions in the list. The more comprehensive methods like MORT, 
STEP, TRIPOD, ECFC, Acci-mapping all requires interviewing persons involved. 
 The most common form of structuring the information gathered is some form of 
diagram, logical tree or a table.  
 The largest difference shows when it comes to analysing the information, where most 
methods use their own accident model or a variance of one. The principles of the energy-
barrier model (Haddon, 1980) is trendsetting in models such as AEB, MORT, Barrier 
analysis, MTO-analysis and ETA.  
 What all these methods have in common is that they focus on the events leading up to 
the accident or incident (i.e. the initiating event), which means little attention is paid to 
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the aftermath. This poses a problem for researchers interested in cascading effects, 
because they take place after the initiating event.  
 A secondary problem, and also related to the first, is that many methods use a narrow 
system perspective. They either focus on a single event chain (AEB, FTA), or in other 
cases also organisational conditions are taken into consideration (MORT, MTO-analysis, 
SCAT) and some stretches even further to governmental level (Acci-map, TRIPOD, 
influence diagram, STEP), but they are still usually confined to a single company, system 
or sector. This might be due to the background of which most of these methods have 
emerged; many were developed to handle occupational hazards (e.g. SCAT, TRIPOD, 
MTO-analysis) or to investigate accidents within certain sectors (e.g. AEB, MORT for 
nuclear industry, ECFC for the U.S. Department of energy, FTA for the U.S. Department 
of Defence).  
 The effects on society are not mentioned explicitly in any of the studied methods and 
this is the level, which the method developed in this thesis is interested in. However, most 
of the studied investigation methods do recognise that the chain of event of an accident is 
affected by conditions. 
 Figure 4 presented below shows a comparison of the methods presented in this 
chapter. The mapping is made with respect to how well the author believes the different 
methods would provide information about the desired characteristics if they were to be 
used while focusing on cascading effects. It is based on the description of the methods 
found in the references noted in the right column. Thus, the methods have not been 
applied on an actual case. 
 From the figure one can draw the conclusion that some methods seem less useful in 
this context, for example MORT and Change analysis. Others are more promising, like 
the STEP-diagram, Acci-map or ECFC/A. There are, however, some problems with using 
any of the accident investigation methods as a cascading effects investigation method, 
since none seems capable of covering all the required characteristics.  
 From the way these methods gather information, the interview or workshops seems 
like the most feasible options. Physical evidence gathering is an option privileged to 
authorities. Schematics could potentially provide a better insight to why a cascading 
effect occurred, but only the parts it describes. However, the schematics usually describe 
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systems on a much lower system level than desired in this thesis. A checklist of questions 
that are adapted to all kinds of events would probably become too extensive. 
 The methods uses several different ways to structure information, but the ones that 
displays it the most clearly are the visual representations such as diagrams or flowcharts. 
Tables quickly become hard to overview and it is hard to represent dependencies in a 
practical way. The influence diagram, the STEP diagram and the Acci-map all displays 
information in a way that makes it easy to get a quick idea of what has happened, they 
also are able to represent dependencies, usually by lines or arrows.  
Figure 4. Comparison of different investigation methods. 
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6 Other methods 
To complement the literature study of incident 
investigation methods, a smaller study of other potential 
methods was conducted.  
 One article dealing with analysis and evaluation of 
emergency response was particularly interesting 
(Abrahamsson, Hassel, & Tehler, 2010). The article 
includes a technique called counterfactual reasoning, 
which is used to create scenarios for evaluating a response. The technique was studied 
additionally and is presented in section 6.1. 
6.1 Counterfactual reasoning 
Counterfactual thinking is something most people do; most of us have had thoughts of the 
following kind: “If I had done this instead of that, then this would have happened 
instead”. A counterfactual thought is often defined as “mental representations that are 
explicitly contrary to facts or beliefs” and do more often than not formulated as 
conditional statements (Roese & Morrison, 2009, p.16). These statements are usually 
divided into an antecedent (“If I had done this”) and a consequent (“then this would have 
happened”).  
 Counterfactual reasoning is closely related, but is an analytical method, which 
constructs alternate scenarios using counterfactual events, usually in order to provide 
input to decision making. It can be used both retrospectively, thus changing historical 
facts or add new ones, or prospectively, making an assessment of the future. 
 According to (Hendrickson, 2008), all counterfactual reasoning should start with 
creating an antecedent scenario, which he describes as a precisely formulated series of 
events that makes the antecedent true. Using the example “If the green party wins the 
election, the coal power plants would be forced to close”, an antecedent scenario consists 
of all the events and circumstances leading up to the green party winning the election 
(such as a skilled party leader, effective campaigning or a political scandal amongst 
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competitors). The general principles when choosing an antecedent scenario is to choose 
the one that preserves history best (in the case of retrospective reasoning), have the 
highest probability and has the fewest amount of deviations from reality (Hendrickson, 
2012). 
 Hendrickson further explains the next step, which is to create the intermediate 
scenario, the series of event from the antecedent being true until the consequent scenario, 
as well as the likelihood of the events (Hendrickson, 2008). In the example above, from 
the election being won until the plants are forced to close (this could include events like 
propositions in parliament, increased taxes on carbon emissions etc.). 
 The final step is the consequent scenario, where the consequence and the aftermath of 
it are described. Here basically every nonzero probability scenario, which is not in 
contradiction to previously described events, is allowed, but they should also be of 
strategic importance for the purpose of the analysis (Hendrickson, 2008). 
 Hendrickson’s guide to counterfactual reasoning is very rigorous and designed 
primarily for the intelligence community, where it is used as a supporting tool for making 
strategic decisions, which may have huge consequences (Hendrickson, 2008). The trade 
off is the time required to make such detailed scenarios, a reasonable trade for an 
organisation with a lot of resources and the need of the best possible assessments.  
 Counterfactual reasoning is not primarily a method for information gathering. 
However, if questions that encourage counterfactual reasoning are asked during an 
interview or a workshop they could give more information about conditions from the 
interviewees. Conditions are related to counterfactual reasoning, since conditions often 
are out of the ordinary and thus easily triggers counterfactual thoughts. As an example, a 
person that usually keeps batteries for emergency flashlights at home. But this day, when 
there is a power failure, there are none to be found, which can be labelled as an 
aggravating condition according to the definition. The first thought that comes to mind is 
probably “if only I had had batteries at home, then I could see what I am doing”, which is 
counterfactual thinking. If taken one step further, the interviewees might have thought of 
such conditions and also the effects of such a conditions, thus a potential cascading 
effect. These potential cascading effects could serve as a compliment to the actual 
documented effects.  
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7 Method for investigating cascading effects 
As can be seen in Figure 3 none of the incident 
investigation methods meet the requirements that has 
been set up earlier. This is not surprising since the 
methods do not ask the same question as is done in this 
thesis. In order to investigate cascading effects, there is 
a need to shift focus from “What caused the accident?” 
to “What did the accident cause?” and accompanying 
follow-up questions. In this chapter a method for investigating cascading effects will be 
proposed, it will be divided into two parts: gathering information and structuring 
information, which will then be shortly summarised in a diagram. The next chapter will 
apply the method in a case study.  
7.1 Gathering information 
For information gathering, a semi-structured interview with key persons within the 
systems is the proposed technique, even though workshops would probably work as well. 
The workshops, however, requires representatives from many organisations to be present 
at the same time, making it hard to schedule. It is also questionable if they are as willing 
to share their experiences in a big group, compared to an interview.  
 Semi-structured interviews are useful for gathering information when the information 
one needs is not clearly defined or are not obvious to the respondent. They allow for 
explaining of terms and are also flexible enough to be adapted during the interview, so 
that an opportunity to gather vital information about the system is not lost. Interviews are 
used by several incident investigation methods as well. 
 However, to be able to perform any interviews, one must identify at least one affected 
system, preferably more. An ideal situation is if there is an existing study, the different 
actors mentioned in the study can then be used to conduct the first series of interviews. 
Alternatively or additionally, media articles can be used to provide an idea of what 
systems are involved, for example if a spokesperson from an agency is mentioned in an 
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article, their organisation is probably involved in some way. Following this identification 
of a first point of contact, snowballing is usually possible as is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. The figure shows the interview snowballing in theory. The top part is the starting point, when little or 
nothing is known. The middle part shows what is known after the first interview, the green square represents an 
interviewed system (X), the yellow square (Z) is a previously not known system that affected X and the red 
squares (Y) represents systems that are dependent on X. The bottom part shows an example after the Y1 system 
has been interviewed, with new information. 
The goal is to identify dependency-pairs, two systems that are connected to each other via 
a dependency, and conditions associated with the pairs. The interviews should focus on 
the core information needed, with some room for improvisation if something of interest is 
mentioned, that is not covered by the interview support. The following subjects should be 
explored during the interview: 
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• Dependencies from other systems 
• Dependencies to other systems 
• Consequences of dependencies: what kind, timespan, spatial extent 
• Mitigating or aggravating conditions 
Additional affected systems should emerge during the interview process, which leads to 
new interviews and so forth. An illustration of the interview process is shown in Figure 5. 
The process can continue until no new systems are found or until the investigator is 
satisfied, for example when interviewing the remaining systems will highly unlikely 
provide any additional information due to the amount of second hand information about 
the system, depending on the purpose of the study.  
 To complement the more straightforward questions about dependencies and 
consequences, a few questions of counterfactual nature is added in the end. The purpose 
of these questions is to encourage respondents to think about fictional events; from there 
it is possible to ask why the event did not occur. This can depend on two things: either 
there is no dependency or there were some kind of condition that prevented the cascade, 
often the later. It is thus believed these questions will help revealing additional 
conditions.  
7.2 Structuring information 
To keep track of what is known and the relations between the systems, they should be 
structured in a working version of a diagram. Here, a variance of a STEP diagram is 
proposed. While there were other candidates, the STEP diagram required the least 
amount of adaptation. In STEP diagrams the different sectors are plotted on the same line 
in the y-axis and the cascade order on the x-axis, see Figure 6. The main difference from 
the original STEP diagram is the use of cascade order instead of time on the x-axis, it also 
focuses more on the consequences of the event, rather than the actions leading up to an 
accident. The type of dependency should be noted as well as short description of main 
consequences. An advantage of the diagram is that it displays a lot of information: the 
systems involved, the dependencies (and what type), the conditions involved with each 
system or cascading effect, the cascade order, which consequences each system suffered 
and from what system.  
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 Each arrow represents a dependency-pair and the boxes show what system is affected 
and what the consequences are. If two originating systems affect the same dependent 
system, the consequences are divided by noting the originating system’s number. 
 When the interviews are finished, the diagrams from each interview should be 
aggregated into one, representing the whole event. A suitable way of doing this is to start 
compiling all the direct effects from the event and insert them in the diagram, if there are 
any duplicates (they have been mentioned in two or more interviews) they should be 
removed. When all the direct effects are moved into the right position, the first order of 
cascading effects are copied into the diagram and again duplicates are removed. This 
proceeds until all effects from the interviews are in the final diagram. 
 
Figure 6. Example of working diagram, a variance of a STEP diagram, by the use of the case Enschede firework 
disaster (Socialstyrelsen, 2004; Webbink, 2008; Yanik, 2001). Dashed lines represent potential cascading effects 
and the green and red texts represent mitigating and aggravating conditions respectively. For more details of the 
incident, see Appendix D – Enschede firework disaster. 
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7.3 Summary 
To provide a better overview of the method, Figure 7 displays the main parts as well as 
the intended order in which they should be executed. What is included in each part is 
described in more detail in the previous sections in this chapter.  
 
Figure 7. A principle flowchart of the whole interview process, from identification of affected systems until the 
finished STEP-diagram.  
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8 Application of method – Malmö flooding 
In this chapter, a minor case study with the purpose of 
testing the proposed method will be presented. The 
main steps of the method are presented in Figure 7. 
First there will be a short introduction of the case, then 
a description of how the study was executed and lastly 
the results are presented. 
 
8.1 Case introduction 
On the 31st of August 2014, a Sunday, around 90 mm of rain fell over Malmö within 24 
hours. It started early morning and a few hours later some organisations reported 
problems with flooding. The damages were many and at times the event was quite 
dramatic, with vehicles stuck in water masses, passengers still inside. The case was 
chosen because of the high potential for cascading effects, its manageable scale for a case 
study and for the convenience of a short travel distance. 
8.2 Execution 
At first media articles from several of the larger Swedish newspapers were examined to 
get a better understanding of the event and to identify organisations that might have had 
experienced the impacts of the flooding. Twelve organisations from different areas were 
identified and contacted, six of them agreed to an interview: RSYD (Rescue service), 
VA-SYD (Water and sanitation), Malmö Stad (Municipal government), Länsförsäkringar 
(Insurance company), Region Skåne (Health care) and Trafikverket (Road and rail 
transportation). All organisations have different responsibilities, but Malmö Stad has 
more of an umbrella responsibility. Other contacted organisations included the county 
police, emergency call centre, the county collective traffic, an electric power company, 
another insurance company and one of the bigger housing associations. 
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 Representatives, with experience from the event, from each organisation were 
interviewed in Swedish. The interviews were conducted with some support (semi-
structured), in the form of some written down questions and space for answers, see 
Appendix C – Interview support (blank). Answers were translated and transferred to a 
digital format and then mapped in a STEP diagram in accordance with the method 
presented in section 7.2. All information the respondents provided was mapped, no 
matter the size of the effects. Both cascading effects and potential cascading effects, thus 
“close calls”, were mapped in the same diagram, but with a clear distinction.  
 During the interviews two of the questions specifically encouraged the respondents to 
engage in counterfactual reasoning: 
Say the flooding happened during a Wednesday. Would the situation be better or 
worse for your organisation? 
What would have improved your organisations ability during the event? 
The first question was included because, from the newspapers, it seemed like the flooding 
caused a lot of problems with the traffic. How much traffic there is on the streets, 
depends a lot on how many people who have to get to work. Since that amount is a lot 
higher during weekdays than weekends, it was deemed interesting to see how it would 
affect the organisations. 
 The second question was deemed interesting since conditions that increases a systems 
ability to handle an event, could potentially be used to mitigate the cascading effects the 
next time a similar event takes place. 
 The questions could of course have been focused on other areas and it is possible to 
change these depending on the event that is being studied. It is important, however, that 
there are at least a few of these included in the interviews. 
 After the completion of all interviews, the mapped information was aggregated into a 
single STEP diagram to get an overview of the event as a whole. To do so, the different 
organisations answers have to be compared with each other. This meant that similar 
effects were sometimes clustered together and duplicates were removed.  
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8.3 Results 
The interviews generated a total of 45 mapped effects and 32 conditions that affected 13 
of the defined systems in section 4.3. Details can be found in Table 1.  
 Figure 8 and Figure 9 shows the aggregated STEP diagram (split up in parts for 
readability) from the case study. Since everything that the respondents deemed important 
enough to mention were mapped, the sizes of the consequences are very diverse; from 
organisations increased workload to flooded basements high-rise buildings to 68 patients 
being evacuated from the hospital (and potentially 300 more). 
Table 1. A summary of results from case study, in numbers. 
Effects (With Potential) 
Direct effects 11 (13) 
First order effects 20 (24) 
Second order effects 8 (8) 
Total 38 (45) 
Conditions 
Aggravating 15 
Mitigating 17 
Total 32 
Dependency type 
Functional 36 
Logical 9 
Geographical 0 
Total  45 
Systems affected 
Total 13 
 As for the two last questions, the ones focusing more on counterfactual reasoning, it 
was possible to get the respondents to think in the way that was intended. To the first 
question, whether the situation would be better or worse if it occurred on a Wednesday, 
the answers were mixed. Three of the organisations thought the situation would be better 
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for them, at least initially (Malmö Stad, Region Skåne, Länsförsäkringar), and for the 
same reason; it would be easier to call in extra personnel or resources on a normal 
working day. The other organisations thought they would be worse of, even though VA-
SYD not so much, and the common reason is the increased traffic in the city, on roads in 
particular.  
 The answers to the last question, what could improve the organisations ability during 
the event, can be summarised into three things: improved cooperation between 
organisations, an early weather warning or better preparedness (in the form of pumps or 
predefined and trained groups of personnel).  
A method for studying cascading effects 
 35 
 
Figure 8. Part one of the case study STEP diagram. To the left are the systems, arrows indicate dependencies, 
boxes represents effects. In the boxes, first the originating system is mentioned by number, then the dependency 
type, the consequences and conditions. Green text represent mitigating conditions, whereas red text indicates 
aggravating conditions. 
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Figure 9. Part two of the case study STEP diagram. To the left are the systems, arrows indicate dependencies, 
boxes represents effects. In the boxes, first the originating system is mentioned by number, then the dependency 
type, the consequences and conditions. Green text represent mitigating conditions, whereas red text indicates 
aggravating conditions. 
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8.4 Method evaluation 
The purpose of the method is to gather and structure information about cascading effects 
and present conditions in a useful and practical way, thus the first thing to be evaluated is 
its ability to gather the sought information. Then its ability to structure information is 
evaluated and lastly some general concerns and impressions are discussed. 
8.4.1 Information gathering 
In order to evaluate the proposed method, it is going to be compared the same way as the 
incident investigation methods. In Figure 4 the investigation methods were compared 
with regard to its estimated ability to identify: dependent system, originating system, 
dependency type, consequences, time start, time end, spatial extent and conditions. Later, 
other observations and experiences will be discussed.  
 From the results presented in Table 1 and in the STEP-diagram (Figure 8 and Figure 
9) one can discern that the method is able to handle most of the criteria, dependent 
systems are there, as is originating systems, dependency types, consequences and 
conditions. However, time start, time end and spatial extent are not covered by the 
method as it is. Initially the intention was to cover these topics during the interviews, but 
it quickly became apparent that asking questions about time and extent regarding every 
cascading effect severely disrupts the flow of the interview. Constantly asking for details 
distracted the respondent from the main topic, cascading effects and related conditions, 
thus already during the first interview it was decided to skip this part. 
 There were times when the effects were very specified, like how many patients were 
evacuated, and other times they were very general, like the blocked roads. In order to 
quantify the cascading effects, it is necessary to ask precise questions, and repeatedly. As 
was the problem with time and spatial extent, these questions interrupted the flow of the 
interviews, however sometimes these questions were asked in spite of this.  
 Since all the effects brought up by the respondents were mapped, there is quite a high 
level of detail in the STEP-diagram, possibly too high level of detail. However, if one 
wants to restrict the number of cascading effects to the more important ones, it is quite 
simple to remove the effects that are deemed insignificant.  
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 During the interviews, quite often the respondents would bring up so called “near 
misses”, events that did not happen, but were stopped just in time, either by 
circumstances or intervention. These near misses were deemed interesting enough to 
map, even though not as a proper cascading effect, because should a similar situation 
arise with different conditions, the near misses have the potential to become cascading 
effects. It is also interesting to see what kind of conditions took part in stopping near 
misses from becoming a problem. 
 The interest from the organisations that participated in the study was quite high and 
sincere, out of twelve asked, six were able and willing to participate. All of them 
provided useful information, to greater or smaller extent, see Appendix A – Interview 
responses and Appendix B – Interview STEP diagrams for an overview. 
 How does this method compare to the more traditional one, i.e. studying post 
assessment reports and articles? In Appendix D – Enschede firework disaster a case from 
the Netherlands is presented, which has been mapped with the same framework as in this 
thesis, but with official reports and scientific articles as the only source of information. A 
comparison of the two events is shown in Table 2. By looking only in the table the result 
might seem clear, but bear in mind only two events have been compared. To come to any 
decisive conclusion, more events need to be studied with both methods.  
Table 2. Comparison of the sources used and amount of information gathered between Malmö flooding and 
Enschede fireworks disaster 
 Malmö flooding Enschede firework 
disaster 
Interviews 6 0 
Written sources 0 3 
Media sources To identify suitable 
participants 
0 
Cascading effects 
(including direct effects) 
45 9 
Conditions 32 8 
Systems affected 13 6 
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Using counterfactual reasoning as a method to gain some extra information about the 
event turned out to be quite natural and useful. The participants often engaged in 
counterfactual reasoning before they were introduced to the last questions in the 
interview support, see Appendix C – Interview support (blank). This is not very 
surprising, since it is something every human engage in every day.  
8.4.2 Structuring information 
The modified STEP diagram provides a good overview of an event and is quite easy to 
use, it does what it should do, give structure. It is not entirely unproblematic however. As 
can be seen in Figure 8 and Figure 9, the map can be quite large, which makes it difficult 
to present.  
 Sometimes it is hard to determine the level of detail in the effects, both which effects 
were relevant and to what detail the effects should be divided into. For example the 
flooding in a basement, which meant 68 patients had to evacuate, could be mapped as one 
effect in the health care system or as two, first the flooding in health care leading to a 
second effect on the public, the evacuation of patients. 
 The system categories presented in section 4.2 were useful and easy to use. Of course 
there were some ambiguities as to which system the cascading effects belong to, but 
using the principle of where it fits best, solved most of the problems. Asking for a second 
opinion can also help in deciding where to map the effect.  
 The aggregation of information from the different interviews is another area where the 
colours are grey. Even though there usually are clear connections between systems and 
effects during each separate interview, the whole picture is not that obvious. Determining 
what happened when and in what order has been hard to map, especially without time-
data (or at least estimates).  
 Removing duplicates and such is a simple matter of comparison, and is noticed easily 
when compiling effects. 
8.4.3 Other impressions 
During the interviews, most of the conditions predicted in section 4.3.8 were brought up. 
Weather conditions naturally, since the event was a flooding. Also the timing aspect was 
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important, in many situations essential equipment were a few minutes or an hour away 
from being flooded.  
 There were, however, other conditions that were mentioned often, such as the 
availability to call in extra personnel to handle the situation, thus the organisations ability 
to mobilize above normal capacity. Another cluster of conditions were related to 
communication between organisations, such as problems establishing a common 
operational picture amongst emergency response organisations. 
 The snowballing effect shown in Figure 5 was not very apparent, however the 6 
interviews provided first-hand information from 8 different systems (Trafikverket and 
VASYD are responsible for two systems each), which resulted in 13 systems affected.  
 The concept of cascading effects is something the respondents could grasp, with little 
effort of explaining, which is helpful. The other terminology could be explained as well, 
even though it is hard to explain it in exactly the same way every time. This of course 
might impact the results a bit, since the understanding of the questions may differ.  
 Interviewing is a technique that can be trained, and as such, the interviews will 
probably increase in quality the more experienced the researcher is. This was noticed 
slightly during the case study, with more experience it was for example easier to explain 
the terminology in a way the respondents would understand. 
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9 Revised method 
The method proposed in chapter 7 works well in many 
aspects: the use of media to identify systems involved 
in the event, the semi-structural interviews provided 
information about originating systems, dependent 
systems, conditions, dependencies, consequences and 
served as an introduction of the subject and 
terminology to the involved persons. The 
counterfactual reasoning also provided some extra information. 
 The suggested method for structuring information also performed reasonably well, no 
problems arose when structuring the interviews into STEP-diagrams one by one, but the 
aggregation of them all into one for the whole event required some effort. 
 However there are some issues that need to be addressed, primarily the lack of time 
data and spatial extent. Also, sometimes the effects mentioned were very general and 
could be specified better. Here, a follow-up conversation, for example via mail or by an 
extra meeting, with questions directed towards time, spatial extent and quantification of 
the cascading effects is suggested. This will be easier now since a contact is already 
established, many organisations spontaneously offered to help out with additional 
questions. With the questions, the map of effects that emerged from the interview should 
be attached, since this will give respondents a chance to correct errors or 
misinterpretations that might have occurred during interviews, or provide additional 
information, which will increase the overall quality of the study.  
 Another issue that arose was the use of cascading effects that did not occur, due to a 
condition that prevented it, so called near misses. It is believed that these effects could be 
treated almost as a real effect, because parallels can be drawn to occupational safety 
management, where they use smaller incidents as near misses of a more serious accident. 
The theory is that if smaller incidents are prevented the serious accidents should be as 
well (Kjellén, 2000, p.154f). Another argument for using these near misses, is that the 
conditions that prevented the effects this time might not be present during the next event. 
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 The new information about time and spatial extent should be integrated into the STEP-
diagram. This can be done simply by adding it with text into the boxes of each cascading 
effect. Alternatively the time could be indicated on the x-axis, as in the original version 
of the STEP-diagram, and the boxes would then stretch from the starting time until the 
effect ended. As for the spatial extent, a possible solution would be to use a nominal scale 
such as: local, regional, national or international effect. 
 The method described in chapter 7 did not contain any way of analysing the 
information, as it is not the focus of this thesis. However, the product of said method, the 
adapted STEP-diagram, should allow for a smooth inputting into a database. From there, 
the use of statistical methods could possibly provide interesting patterns or insights. 
 The revised method has not yet been tested due to the limited time available, however 
it is believed that the revised method will provide information of all the required 
characteristics. That said, it would probably never be able to provide a complete 
recollection of an event, due to the complexity of the systems involved. Figure 10 
provides an overview of the method, step by step.  
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Figure 10. An overview of the revised method. The interview rounds can be repeated until the researcher is 
satisfied with the results or until the time cost outweighs the benefit. The blue boxes are additions to the original 
method.  
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10 Discussion 
Here, the focus lies on the author’s own reflections regarding various parts of the thesis. 
This includes subject such as: findings, problems, experiences, beliefs and more. 
 First out is the general work process, followed by the use of the CascEff projects 
definitions and system boundaries. The third section will discuss the findings of literature 
review of existing investigation methods. The next section covers the thoughts regarding 
the application of the method on the Malmö flooding, followed by a section dealing with 
the revised method. Lastly, suggestions for further research are presented.  
10.1 Work process 
The work process provided structure both for the work and the report, in a helpful way. 
However, it was not followed exactly as presented, since some of the activities were 
performed simultaneously, for example the literature review of incident investigation 
methods and the other methods gathering information.  
 The proposal, application, evaluation and revision of a method is a process that can be 
performed several time in order to refine it. In this thesis only one iteration was 
performed, if there were more time available a second iteration would have been done.  
10.2 Definitions and system boundaries 
The use of existing definitions and terminology from the CascEff project has had its 
benefits in this thesis; it saved a great deal of time compared to developing it on your 
own, it makes use of existing research and it has been developed by several researchers, 
which usually results in a more well thought through product than a single person could 
produce. This means focus can be shifted towards developing the method and apply it on 
a case instead.  
 On the other hand it reduces the freedom of defining everything as you would like and 
it might not be the best possible definition out there. Another potential problem is the 
possibility of misinterpreting the terminology and use the terms in a faulty way or out of 
the proper context. It is however believed the definitions used in this thesis are well 
aligned with the purpose.  
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 The CascEff definition of cascading effects, its characteristics and system boundaries 
has proven to be useful. Some ambiguities arose when mapping cascading effects 
according to the system boundaries, since the boundaries are not very clearly defined. 
However, defining system boundaries is a whole field of science on its own and at some 
point one has to balance detail and precision versus time and pragmatism. It is not very 
practical to have a hundred clearly defined systems to chose as originating or dependent 
system, even though it would increase the level of detail of the cascading effects.  
10.3 Existing incident investigation methods review 
The review covers 14 different investigation methods, each presented shortly. The 
presentations could have been longer, but they are not the main focus of this thesis. Using 
the two existing reviews as a start, allowed for faster in-depth studying of each 
investigation method. 
 It is no surprise that there are few of these methods suitable for investigating 
cascading effects, since that is not what they were designed for. They are designed to 
answer the question “What caused the accident?” and not “What did the accident cause?”. 
However, some of the methods proved useful anyway, especially the STEP-diagrams 
method of organising information of the accident. This was adopted almost in its entirety, 
but with more information than the original version provided. 
 Many of the investigation methods included interviews as way to gather information 
of the accident and this was also used in the method for investigating cascading effects. 
But given the timeframe of this thesis (a few months) and the timeframe of incident 
investigations (often years when investigating bigger events), shorter interviews had to be 
made.  
10.4 Application of method 
The choice of the Malmö flooding as a case was made both because it was clear there 
would be cascading effects, some of which were reported in the news, and of 
convenience since the city is located nearby the university. Another deciding factor was 
that the event was not that big, on the large scale of things. This was intentional, so it 
would fit the timeframe of the thesis. 
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 The interviews proceeded relatively well, considering the lack of experience with 
interviews on my behalf. The amount of useful information provided from each 
organisation varied, this could be due the organisations knowledge, which organisation 
was most vulnerable, how the questions were phrased and understood, the interpretation 
of the answers or a number of other reasons.  
 There results from the case study shows that there is information to be found regarding 
cascading effects, at least given the definitions and terminology used. It also seems like it 
provides some more depth than a regular study of post assessment reports, even though 
the sample is by no way satisfactory to draw any conclusion that this is always the case. 
 Something that might have affected the results from the study is the deviation in how 
the questions were asked, it is hard to keep to the scripted questions as it is, and when the 
respondent did not get what you were asking, further explanation is required. Needless to 
say, the way terms were explained varied from time to time. Another issue is that the 
participating organisations have relationships with each other, which I felt triggered a 
mild in-group bias in the responses. Such things are hard to confirm though. The 
interviews were conducted in Swedish, since it is everyone’s native language, and the 
answers were translated into English, so there is always the possibility of bad 
translations, adding extra meaning or losing some of the meaning.  
 Another interesting aspect of the study is the amount of conditions found, affecting 
both systems as whole and particular cascading effects, more than I anticipated would be 
possible. Some of the conditions were predicted before the study was conducted, such as 
the importance of timing and weather conditions, but one type that was overlooked and 
that was the organisations ability to increase its working capacity. This was often 
dependent on the availability of extra personnel and was brought up a lot by the 
organisations. 
 The use of counterfactual reasoning in the interviews generated some extra results, 
which might not otherwise been brought up by the respondents. In some interviews it 
appeared naturally, before asking the specific questions to lead them. Even though most 
humans do this frequently, it is probably a good idea to specifically direct the respondents 
towards this way of thinking since it is easy to be trapped into thinking only of actual 
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facts. Counterfactual reasoning could probably be used even more than suggested here, 
and also in other research situations. 
10.5 Revised method  
The changes suggested in the revision of the method are supposed to remedy the flaws 
detected during the case study. It was quickly obvious that asking questions about time, 
exact effects and spatial extent every time a cascading effect were mentioned would 
disrupt the flow of the interviews severely. 
 The information is still sought after, thus a follow-up interview or mail conversation 
was suggested. It uncertain if this will work, since there was not enough time to send out 
request, give them enough time to respond and then update the results. There should be 
good chances of success though, since the respondents now know the terminology and 
have time to prepare a more detailed answer than is possible in an hour-long interview. 
On the other hand it is uncertain if they are willing to use even more of their time on a 
study like this without being compensated for it, for larger studies funding for this might 
be a requirement.  
 Problem still exist with the revised method, however. The time required to conduct a 
series of interviews and follow-up conversations is definitely longer than the time it takes 
to analyse reports, even though the amount of information gathered seems to be larger. 
Another problem is that interviews are hard to standardise and the quality depends greatly 
on the skills of the interviewer, so it is preferred that the person(s) conducting the study 
has some previous experience, something I felt I was lacking. A third problem has to do 
with the level of detail of the consequences, if the focus is on societal level, some of the 
results surely can be disregarded. This can be done afterwards, but also means that more 
information is gathered than is needed. 
 Overall the revised method should, despite its flaws, provide a solid foundation for 
further studies of cascading effects, especially when the written material is scarce. 
Possibly also as an alternative when the amount of written material is overwhelming, if 
one could find the best candidates for an interview, it might be faster than going through 
a huge pile of reports.  
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10.6 Usability 
The method itself should be usable for researchers who are doing empirical work on 
cascading effects, as a complementary tool used with post-disaster assessments and the 
like. Perhaps post-disaster investigation teams or could also have use of this method, 
when conducting their investigations 
 The results from the method could, with a more substantial amount of cases, be used 
to identify especially vulnerable systems, as a part of a long-term protection plan for 
critical infrastructure. An additional use is to provide support, or inspiration, to municipal 
emergency response planners, by having examples of cascade effects that are possible. 
Other long-term uses include modelling of cascading effects or a development of a 
decision support tool, where incident commanders can get information about potential 
cascading effects in the situation they are in, thus giving them a better chance of 
implementing effective countermeasures.  
10.7 Further research 
The development of a firm, widely agreed definition of cascading effects and its 
terminology should be a priority. If there were a widespread terminology that incident 
investigators could use to write a small chapter specifically dedicated to cascading effects 
in their reports, it would drastically increase the amount of information that could be 
analysed. This would be useful for all researchers of the subject and would most likely 
increase the understanding of cascading effects.  
 Another area of interest is when there are conflicting perceptions of an event, 
regarding responsibilities and dependencies between the different systems. How does one 
deal with such situations? Whose perception should be presented? Both?  
 As for the method presented in this thesis, more applications, evaluations and 
revisions would lead to a more refined research method.  
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11 Conclusion 
With the definition and terminology used, a suitable method for studying cascading 
effects should provide information about the: 
• Originating system 
• Dependent system 
• Dependency type 
• Consequences on the dependent system(s) 
• Starting and ending time of the cascading effect 
• Spatial extent  
• Cascade order 
• Conditions 
Knowing these characteristics should provide a solid foundation for a larger analysis of 
cascading effects, when several more events have been studied.  
 The literature review of incident investigation methods showed that none of the 
reviewed methods would meet these criteria fully, often due to the fact that they do not 
look beyond the initial incident. However, from these methods, semi-structured 
interviews were deemed to be the most suitable way to gather information and an adapted 
version of the STEP diagram for structuring information. Ideas from counterfactual 
reasoning were used to better capture conditions during interviews. 
 The original method consisted of the following steps:  
• Identify potentially affected systems through media reports. 
• Map and contact actors within systems. 
• Conduct semi-structured interviews, focusing on: dependencies from and to other 
systems, consequences of the dependencies, time and spatial extent included, and 
mitigating and aggravating conditions. 
• Map the found information into a STEP-diagram as shown in Figure 6 for each 
interview. Contact newly found systems for another round of interviews. 
• Aggregate all the STEP-diagrams from the interviews into one, picturing the 
event as a whole.  
A case study on the flooding of Malmö late summer of 2014 revealed some flaws of the 
method, it had problems determining the time data, the spatial extent and sometimes the 
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effects were not very detailed. However it also showed that it was possible to gather and 
structure a sizeable amount of information in the suggested way.  
 With experience from the case study, the method was developed further, in order to 
better meet all the criteria and to do it in a more practical way. A follow-up conversation 
was added, preferably via email, where the researcher can supply the interviewees with a 
STEP-diagram of the interview and ask for details of time, spatial extent and 
consequences. 
 Even though the revised method has not been fully tested, the concept seems to work: 
it is certainly a viable method for a more in-depth investigation of the cascading effects 
of an event. An advantage with this method is its ability to include “near misses”, which 
gives bonus data if they are treated almost as an equal to an actual effect. Also, the 
conditions provided by this method give a better understanding of why a cascading effect 
occurred and could possibly be used to prevent future cascading effects.  
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13 Appendix A – Interview responses 
Here, all the responses from the interviews are presented in its original form. The original 
interview support is found in Appendix C – Interview support (blank). 
VA-SYD 
Date: 2014-11-14  Name: Marianne Beckman, Ulf Nyberg 
Sector: Water supply/Sewage  
Organisation: VA-SYD  
Tell me about the ordinary activities in your organisation 
Freshwater supply dept. (pipe network) 
Waste water dept. (including day water) 
During the event, did your organisation experience trouble caused by another 
organisation not related to your own field of operations? 
 
Dependencies 
	  
Type	   Free	  text	  
Power	  systems	   	   Pump	  stations	  needs	  power	  (all	  worked	  during	  the	  event	  
though)	  
Telecommunication	   	   Telephones:	  Organising	  personnel	  etc	  (minor	  issues)	  
Mail	  (also	  worked)	  
Road	  transportation	   	   Getting	  to	  and	  forth	  to	  pump	  stations	  etc.	  Water	  hindered	  
mobility	  
Governmental	  systems	   	   How	   the	   municipal	   technical	   department	   works	   affects	  
the	  work	  of	  VA-­‐SYD.	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Emergency	   response	  
system	  
	   SOS-­‐alarm	   handles	   all	   emergency	   calls	   during	  
evenings/weekends	  (no	  problem	  though)	  
 
Dependencies TO other systems:  
Road transportation: VA-SYD responsible for some pumps that removes day water from 
roads such as under viaducts. Some did not work, some were flooded, resulting in flooded 
roads. 
Rail transportation: same as road, but less extensive (no problem during the event) 
 
Health care: hospital flooded cellars 
Public: flooded cellars in many houses 
Education: some schools flooded 
 
(also from sewage to water supply, did not happen, but was close) 
Are there any conditions that affected the effect or the possibility of the dependencies? 
Conditions 
Mitigating Aggravating 
Happened on a weekend, which meant that 
people stayed at home, made it easier to 
work 
Contact with municipality not very good. 
End of vacations, thus extra personnel were 
at home and could be used 
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Mobilisation of personnel went smooth, 
enough available 
 
What if the flooding happened during a Wednesday? Would the situation be better or 
worse for your organisation? 
Most probably more disruptions, but not so much for the organisation. 
If the sea level were higher it could have had a very negative impact on the event. 
Same if the ground was more saturated or if two similar events happened in close 
proximity. 
What would have improved your organisations ability during the event? 
Could not think of anything in particular, overall happy with the way they handled the 
situation.  
RSYD 
Date: 2014-10-24 Name: Mats Nilsson 
Sector: ERS  
Organisation: RSYD  
Tell me about the ordinary activities in your organisation 
 
 
During the event, did your organisation experience trouble caused by another 
organisation not related to your own field of operations? 
 
Dependencies 
	  
Type	   Free	  text	  
Power	  systems	   	   Power	   outage	   at	   Kronprinsen:	   people	   stuck	   in	   elevator,	  
required	  resources	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Sewage	  system	   	   Backflow	   lead	   to	   extra	   workload,	   people	   calling	   and	  
receiving	  help	  from	  RSYD	  if	  RSYD	  was	  able	  to.	  	  
Road	  transportation	   	   Troubles	  cooperating	  (required	  transportation)	  and	  get	  to	  
accidents,	  fires	  etc.	  Increased	  response	  time.	  	  
Dependencies TO other systems:  
EON: District heating plant threatened to be flooded, the emergency services place pumps. 
Would probably be flooded if no help had arrived. 
 
Malmö Hospital: Pumping to avoid flooding of hospital buildings 
Are there any conditions that affected the effect or the possibility of the dependencies? 
Conditions 
Mitigating Aggravating 
Were able to call in extra personnel. Harder to cooperate with municipality 
during weekends, they do not have much 
personnel on call. 
Prioritisations and plans for this kind of 
event already existed. 
No early warning from the Swedish 
meteorological institute. 
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What if the flooding happened during a Wednesday? Would the situation be better or 
worse for your organisation? 
+ There would be more personnel available, and much faster. 
- More traffic, people going to work. Would probably lead to more cars getting stuck and 
even harder to get by on the roads. 
In total: would probably affect the organisation to the worse 
What would have improved your organisations ability during the event? 
Better cooperation with other involved actors, including a quick response staff. Such 
cooperation exists to some extent, but should be utilised more often.  
 
Trafikverket 
Date: 2014-11-25  Name: Nina Börstad, Rikard Andersson 
Sector: Road Transportation/Rail 
Transportation 
 
Organisation: Trafikverket   
Tell me about the ordinary activities in your organisation 
Responsible for the road and rail network in south of Sweden  
 
During the event, did your organisation experience trouble caused by another 
organisation not related to your own field of operations? 
 
Dependencies 
	  
Type	   Free	  text	  
Initiating	  event	   	   Railroad	  tracks	  flooded	  at	  Svågertorp,	  no	  goods	  trains	  for	  
a	  day	  
Close:	  whole	  IT-­‐system	  almost	  flooded,	  Condition:	  pumps	  
already	  installed	  1	  extra	  had	  to	  be	  put	  in	  
Road:	  Almost	  all	  major	  roads	  to	  and	  from	  Malmö	  flooded,	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E6	  Vellinge	  closed	  because	  of	  slide	  
	  
Sewage	  system	   	   Pump	   that	   clears	   viaduct	   from	   water,	   stopped	   working	  
due	  to	  flooded	  electrical	  component:	  blocked	  road	  
The	  public	   	   People	  moved	   roadblocks	   =>	  Had	   to	   send	  out	   personnel	  
(and	   police	   helped)	   continuously	   to	   the	   same	   places	   to	  
restore	   them	   also	   danger	   to	   drivers	   +	   more	   people	   got	  
stuck	  in	  water,	  affecting	  rescue	  services	  
Dependencies TO other systems:  
From road to public: really hard to get from/to Malmö, even harder on the bridge 
From	  road	  to	  rail:	  train	  easiest	  way	  to	  get	  over	  the	  Denmark-­‐Sweden	  bridge,	  increased	  load	  
From road to business: blocked roads meant longer transportation and delays 
 
Are there any conditions that affected the effect or the possibility of the dependencies? 
Conditions 
Mitigating Aggravating 
6 trucks was out in the field working with a 
closed road in Lund (20-30 min from 
Malmö), redirected to handle flooding 
There were some technical disruptions in the 
internal telecommunication servers 
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Trafikverket uses the same personnel for 
incident management on roads as the 
municipality (they have different 
responsibilities), which leads to a better 
overview of whole Malmö, and not only the 
state roads 
No full effect available on rail power supply 
(reason unknown) => trains had to accelerate 
slower than normal (small delays) 
 No early warning from weather institutes 
What if the flooding happened during a Wednesday? Would the situation be better or 
worse for your organisation? 
Pros: More personnel available 
Cons: more traffic on road/rail 
Overall: most probably worse 
What would have improved your organisations ability during the event? 
An early warning would have lead to more on-call personnel to handle the event 
Region Skåne 
Date: 2014-11-17  Name: Stefan J Persson 
Sector: Healthcare  
Organisation: Region Skåne  
Tell me about the ordinary activities in your organisation 
Provides healthcare for Skåne, the hospital serves Malmö with surroundings 
During the event, did your organisation experience trouble caused by another 
organisation not related to your own field of operations? 
Dependencies 
	  
Type	   Free	  text	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Initiating	  event	   	   Electrical	   switchgear	   flooded	   in	   one	   building	   leading	   to	  
evacuation	   of	   68	   patients.	   A	   heating	   central	   almost	  
flooded,	  as	  well	  as	  another	  switchgear	  –	  threatening	  300	  
patients.	  Over	  2500	  cubic	  meter	  of	  water	  in	  buildings,	  20	  
elevators	   drowned.	   The	   central	   for	   sterile	   equipment	  
flooded.	  
Business	   	   Without	   PULS	   (has	   large	   trucks	   with	   pumps	   etc)	   the	  
second	  switchgear	  would	  be	  flooded,	  danger	  to	  patients.	  
Emergency	   response	  
system	  
	   Without	  the	  rescue	  services	  the	  second	  switchgear	  would	  
be	  flooded,	  danger	  to	  patients.	  
Dependencies TO other systems:  
 
Are there any conditions that affected the effect or the possibility of the dependencies? 
Conditions 
Mitigating Aggravating 
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Preparedness plan worked well No premade contracts with firms like Puls 
 No pumps on their own 
 Hard to contact VA-SYD in order to co-
operate 
 Hospital extra sensitive to the sewage water 
that flooded the buildings.  
What if the flooding happened during a Wednesday? Would the situation be better or 
worse for your organisation? 
Maybe easier to get hold of more external resources quicker 
If anything: a bit better 
What would have improved your organisations ability during the event? 
A small emergency wagon with one or two big pumps 
Malmö Stad 
Date: 2014-11-27  Name: Magnus Fjällström  
Sector: Government (local level)  
Organisation: Malmö Stad  
Tell me about the ordinary activities in your organisation 
Malmö Stad is responsible for elderly care, education, roads, waste disposal and more in 
the municipality.  
During the event, did your organisation experience trouble caused by another 
organisation not related to your own field of operations? 
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Dependencies 
	  
Type	   Free	  text	  
Initiating	  event	   	   Garage	   with	   vehicles	   for	   school	   transport	   for	   special	  
needs	  children	  flooded	  (great	  material	  costs)	  
Roads	  flooded	  and	  viaducts	  flooded	  
Municipal	  IT/telecom	  system	  flooded	  
High	  rise	  building	  basement	  flooded,	  no	  power	  
Flooded	  basements	  in	  hospital	  
Power	  system	  
	  
	   No	  power	   in	   high	   rise	  building	   led	   to	   complications	  with	  
elderly	  care	  clients	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  evacuated	  
Health	  care	   	   Elder	  care	  clients	  whose	  caretakers	  could	  not	  reach	  them	  
worried	  
Planning	   to	   take	   care	   of	   many	   patients	   due	   to	   possible	  
evacuation	  of	  a	  hospital	  building	  
Road	  transportation	   	   Elderly	  care	  personnel	  could	  not	  reach	  all	  clients	  
The	  public	   	   Worried	  people,	  or	  people	  with	  normal	  flooding	  problems	  
called	  the	  emergency	   line	  of	  social	  services	   (dealing	  with	  
abused	   children	   etc).	   People	   with	   real	   social	   services	  
incidents	  to	  report	  had	  troubles	  getting	  through.	  
Dependencies TO other systems:  
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Municipality didn’t manage to keep roads open, which affected the works of emergency 
response services 
 
Some of the municipal buildings without IT, among them a clinic 
 
Problems with common operational picture, especially the closed off roads. Information 
needed by emergency response services 
Are there any conditions that affected the effect or the possibility of the dependencies? 
Conditions 
Mitigating Aggravating 
Were able to call in extra personnel No early weather warning  
Could reroute municipal IT/telecom to other 
servers that were not flooded 
 
Taxis could provide school rides for the 
special needs children  
 
What if the flooding happened during a Wednesday? Would the situation be better or 
worse for your organisation? 
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+ easier to get more personnel, able to warn different departments to secure sensitive 
stuff from the water (less material damages), the school buses would not be in the flooded 
garage 
- More vulnerable to the telecom downtime 
What would have improved your organisations ability during the event? 
Early warning from the meteorological institute would have indicated the seriousness of 
the situation earlier. 
Länsförsäkringar 
Date: 2014-11-17  Name: Heléne Nilsson 
Sector: Finance (insurance)  
Organisation: Länsförsäkringar  
Tell me about the ordinary activities in your organisation 
Insures buildings etc 
Approves compensation for damages  
During the event, did your organisation experience trouble caused by another 
organisation not related to your own field of operations? 
Dependencies 
	  
Type	   Free	  text	  
Power	  systems	   	   Power	   losses	   at	   some	   sites	  made	   it	   harder	   to	   pump	  out	  
water,	  increased	  damages.	  Ex	  Kronprinsen	  
Sewage	  system	   	   Flooded	   cellars	   caused	  a	   lot	  of	   damages	   to	   clients,	   extra	  
work	  and	  cost	  for	  the	  organisation	  
Business	   	   Contractors	   for	   sanitation,	   drying	   of	   houses	   and	  
reconstruction.	   Org.	   does	   not	   have	   that	   expertise	  
themselves.	   Limits	   the	   amount	   of	   support	   they	   can	   give	  
customers	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Dependencies TO other systems:  
Public – needs approval of costs from the insurance company before they can start 
reparations etc. 
 
Business – contractors that restore the building to habitable conditions (sanitation, drying, 
construction) needs an OK from the insurance company before they start any work, to 
insure they get paid.  
Are there any conditions that affected the effect or the possibility of the dependencies? 
Conditions 
Mitigating Aggravating 
The organisation had experience from 
several storms, which they utilised in this 
case. 
No early warning – took a day to mobilise 
personnel. 
What if the flooding happened during a Wednesday? Would the situation be better or 
worse for your organisation? 
Initially better – there would be more personnel available to quickly take care of the large 
amount of incoming calls 
What would have improved your organisations ability during the event? 
Preparedness in form of a predefined group of workers who will deal only with a 
flooding event and which are trained regularly for dealing with flooding damages. 
Already implemented today. 
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15 Appendix C – Interview support (blank) 
Interview-support 
Date:  Name: 
Sector:  
Organisation:  
Tell me about the ordinary activities in your organisation 
 
 
 
During the event, did your organisation experience trouble caused by another 
organisation not related to your own field of operations? 
 
Dependencies 
	  
Type	   Free	  text	  
Power	  systems	   	   	  
Telecommunication	   	   	  
Water	  supply	  system	   	   	  
Sewage	  system	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Oil	  and	  gas	  system	   	   	  
District	  heating	   	   	  
Health	  care	   	   	  
Education	   	   	  
Road	  transportation	   	   	  
Rail	  transportation	   	   	  
Air	  transportation	   	   	  
Sea	  transportation	   	   	  
Agriculture	   	   	  
Business	   	   	  
Media	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Financial	  system	   	   	  
Governmental	  systems	   	   	  
Emergency	   response	  
system	  
	   	  
The	  public	   	   	  
Environment	   	   	  
Political	  system	   	   	  
 
  
A method for studying cascading effects 
 77 
Dependencies TO other systems:  
 
Are there any conditions that affected the effect or the possibility of the dependencies? 
Conditions 
Mitigating Aggravating 
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What if the flooding happened during a Wednesday? Would the situation be better or 
worse for your organisation? 
 
 
 
What would have improved your organisations ability during the event? 
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16 Appendix D – Enschede firework disaster 
This appendix will shortly introduce the Enschede firework disaster and the results from 
a document study conducted on the event.  
 In Enschede, on 13th of May 2000, a fire broke out in a firework warehouse. During 
the efforts to put out the fire, several explosions occurred, instantly killing four fire 
fighters and a journalist. In total 24 people were killed, 900 were injured and over 5000 
became homeless (Socialstyrelsen, 2004).  
 The study was conducted with three written sources of information, using no media 
reports (Socialstyrelsen, 2004; Webbink, 2008; Yanik, 2001). The event was mapped the 
same way that the interviews in this thesis have been mapped. 
 
Figure 11. STEP diagram of the Eschede firework disaster. 
